We review the notion of a classical random cipher and its advantages. We sharpen the usual description of random ciphers to a particular mathematical characterization suggested by the salient feature responsible for their increased security. We describe a concrete system known as αη and show that it is equivalent to a random cipher in which the required randomization is effected by coherent-state quantum noise. We describe the currently known security features of αη and similar systems. We show how αη used in conjunction with any standard stream cipher such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) provides an additional qualitatively different layer of security from physical encryption against known-plaintext attacks on the key. We refute some claims in the literature that αη is equivalent to a non-random stream cipher. *
Introduction
The possibility of achieving greater secrecy by introducing additional randomness into the plaintext of a cipher before encryption was known, according to [1] , already to Gauss, in the form of the so-called 'homophonic substitution'. Such a procedure is an example of a random cipher [1, 2] . The advantage of a random cipher not present in standard nonrandom ciphers is that it can provide information-theoretic security of the key against statistical attacks, and possibly known-plaintext attacks (See Sec. 2.2 in the following and also [2, 3] ). A somewhat detailed description of these possibilities is one of the goals of this paper. In spite of the potential advantages of random ciphers, a large obstacle in their deployment is the bandwidth expansion, or more accurately data rate reduction, that is needed to operate all previous random ciphers. Also, it is not currently possible to generate true random numbers at speeds high enough for random ciphers to operate at sufficiently high data rates (∼ Mbps is the current upper limit for random number generation). The quantum noise in optical coherent-state signals may be utilized for this purpose, and quantum optical effects seem to be the only technologically feasible way to generate > Gbps true random numbers. A particular quantum noise-based random cipher, called αη, that also does not entail data rate reduction, has already been proposed and implemented [3, 4] at Northwestern University. In a previous preprint [2] , αη was discussed concomitantly with that of the closely related key generation system called αη-KG. Since the features of αη direct encryption are subtle and complex enough, we take the approach in this paper of discussing just the αη encryption system in its own right, and analyze quantitatively its random cipher feature. Doing so will hopefully also avert many possible confusions with αη-Key Generation, such as those in [5, 6] . In particular, we will set up in detail the proper framework to understand and analyze the security issues involved. Note that the present paper can be understood independently of ref. [2] .
Following our discussion of random ciphers in general and the αη cryptosystem, we show that αη security is equivalent to that of a corresponding classical random cipher. We show how quantum noise allows some degree of randomization in αη without sacrificing data rate. We also show how αη can be operated on top of a standard cipher like AES to provide additional security based on quantum noise against known-plaintext attacks on the key. Against ciphertext-only attacks, αη security is usually worse than that of the standard cipher used in it. We will indicate what additional techniques can alleviate this problem. Following this, we also rebut claims in [5, 6] that αη security is equivalent to that of a standard stream cipher and that αη is nonrandom.
The plan of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we provide the necessary review of standard cryptography. In particular, we define the random cipher concept quantitatively and point out the available results on random cipher security. This sets the stage for our definitions in Section 3 that characterize a quantum cipher and a quantum random cipher, which are both ciphers in which the ciphertext is in the form of a quantum state. In Section 4, we describe the αη system in detail, show its quantum random cipher characteristics, and highlight its advantages. In Section 5, we respond to the criticisms on αη made by Nishioka et al.
Standard Cryptography and Random Ciphers 2.1 Random and Non-random ciphers
We review the basics of symmetric-key data encryption. Further details can be found in, e.g., [1, 7] . Throughout the paper, random variables will be denoted by upper-case letters such as K, X 1 etc. It is sometimes necessary to consider explicitly sequences of random variables (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ). We will denote such vector random variables by a boldface upper-case letter X n and, whenever necessary, indicate the length of the vector (n in this case) as a subscript. Confusion with the n-th component X n of X n should not arise as the latter is a boldface vector. Particular values taken by these random variables will be denoted by similar lower-case alphabets. Thus, particular values taken by the key random variable K are denoted by k, k ′ etc. Similarly, a particular value of X n can be denoted x n . The plaintext alphabet will be denoted X , the set of possible key values K and the ciphertext alphabet Y. Thus, for example, the sequences x n ∈ X n . In most nonrandom ciphers, X is simply the set {0, 1} and Y = X .
With the above notations, the n-symbol long plaintext (i.e., the message sequence that needs to be encrypted) is denoted by the random vector X n , the corresponding ciphertext (i.e., the output of the encryption mechanism) is denoted Y n and the secret key used for encryption is denoted K. In this paper, we will often call the legitimate sender of the message 'Alice', the legitimate receiver 'Bob', and the attacker (or eavesdropper) 'Eve'. Note that although the secret key is typically a sequence of bits, we do not use vector notation for it since the bits constituting the key will not need to be singled out separately in our considerations in this paper. In standard cryptography, one usually deals with nonrandom ciphers. These are ciphers for which the ciphertext is a function of only the plaintext and key. In other words, there is an encyption function E k (·) such that:
There is a corresponding decryption function D k (·) such that:
In such a case, the X i and Y i , i = 1, . . . , n are usually taken to be from the same alphabet.
In contrast, a random cipher makes use of an additional random variable R called the private randomizer [1] , generated by Alice while encrypting the plaintext and known only to her. Thus the ciphertext is determined as follows:
Because of the additional randomness in the ciphertext, it typically happens that the ciphertext alphabet Y needs to be larger than the plaintext alphabet X . It may even be a continuous infinite alphabet, e.g. an analog voltage value. However, we still require that Bob be able to decrypt with just the ciphertext and key (i.e., without knowing R), so that there exists a function D k (·) such that:
We note that random ciphers are called 'privately randomized ciphers' in Ref.
[1]we will however use the shorter term 'random cipher' (Note that 'random cipher' is used in a completely different sense by Shannon [8] ).
The above description of random and nonrandom ciphers is a bit too general from the point of view of applications. Most ciphers in current use (which are all nonrandom), such as AES, are stream ciphers [7] . In a stream cipher, the key K is first expanded using a deterministic function into a much longer sequence (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) called the keystream. The defining property of a stream cipher is that the i-th ciphertext symbol y i be a function of just the i-th keystream symbol z i and the earlier and current plaintext symbols x 1 , . . . , x i :
It follows that decryption of the first i symbols of plaintext is possible from the first i symbols of ciphertext and the key. A synchronous stream cipher is one for which
Thus, the i-th ciphertext symbol depends only on the i-th plaintext symbol and the i-th keystream symbol, i.e., the cipher is memoryless. For our discussion of random ciphers, we will restrict ourselves for concreteness to the case of random stream ciphers, that are defined by:
Here, the {R i } are randomizers may be assumed to be independent random variables (this is the case in αη), but this is not necessary. In the rest of the paper, a random cipher will always mean a random stream cipher.
We note that the presence or absence of the private randomizer R may be indicated using the conditional Shannon entropy (We assume a basic familiarity with Shannon entropy and conditional entropy. See any information theory textbook, e.g., [9] .). For nonrandom ciphers, we have from Eq.(1) that
On the other hand, a random cipher satisfies
due to the randomness supplied by the private randomizer R. The decryption condition Eqs. (2, 4) for both random and nonrandom ciphers has the entropic characterization:
Condition (9) was used in ref. [1] as the definition of a random cipher. Note that this characterization of a random cipher is problematic when the ciphertext alphabet is continuous because then the Shannon entropy is not defined. One may then need to use differential entropy or alternatively, it may be argued that the finite precision of measurement forces the ciphertext alphabet to be discrete. Indeed, in Sec. 2.3, we define a parameter Λ that characterizes the "degree of randomness" of a random cipher. However, the definition makes sense, similar to Eq. (9), only when the ciphertext alphabet is finite, or at most discrete. These remarks apart, we will see in Sec. 2.3 that, as far as security against known-plaintext attacks is concerned, one can define a pertinent security parameter Γ irrespective of the nature of the ciphertext alphabet.
By standard cryptography, we shall mean that Eve and Bob both observe the same ciphertext random variable, i.e., Y E n = Y B n = Y n . Thus, standard cryptography includes usual mathematical private-key (and also public-key) cryptography but excludes quantum cryptography and classical-noise cryptography [10] . For a standard cipher, random or nonrandom, one can readily prove from the above definitions the following result known as the Shannon limit [1, 8] :
This result may be thought of as saying that no matter how long the plaintext sequence is, the attacker's uncertainty on it given the ciphertext cannot be greater than that of the key. This condition is of crucial importance in both direct encryption and key generation, as brought out in refs. [4, 2, 14, 16, 21] , but was missed in previous criticisms of αη [5, 6, 11] .
By information-theoretic security (or IT security) on the data, we mean that Eve cannot, even with unlimited computational power, pin down uniquely the plaintext from the ciphertext, i.e.,
The level of such security may be quantified by H(X n |Y n ). Shannon has defined perfect security [8] to mean that the plaintext is statistically independent of the ciphertext, i.e.,
With the advent of quantum cryptography, the term 'unconditional security' has come to be used, unfortunately in many possible senses. By unconditional security, we shall mean near-perfect information-theoretic security against all attacks consistent with the known laws of quantum physics.
Incidentally, note that the Shannon limit Eq(11) immediately shows that perfect security can be attained only if H(X n ) ≤ H(K), so that, in general, the key needs to be as long as the plaintext.
Security statements on ciphers are naturally made with respect to particular possible attacks, which we now discuss.
Security under Statistical and Known-Plaintext Attacks
We fix the following terminology for discussions in this paper following [2] . This terminology is not standard, however. In the cryptography literature, what we call statistical attacks are sometimes referred to as ciphertext-only attacks (See, e.g., [7] , Ch. 2) but are also often lumped together with known-plaintext attacks.
By a ciphertext-only attack (CTA), we refer to the case where the probability distribution p(X n ) is completely uniform, i.e., p(X n ) = 2 −n to Eve, so that her attack cannot exploit input frequencies or correlations and must be based only on the ciphertext in her possession. By a statistical attack (STA), we refer to the case where the probability distribution p(X n ) is nonuniform, so that Eve may in principle exploit input frequencies or correlations to launch a better attack. Such an attack is typical when the plaintext is in a language such as English. It is also the attack that obtains when the {X i } are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) but each p(X i ) is nonuniform. By a known-plaintext attack (KPA) we mean the case where Eve knows exactly some length m of plaintext x m . Finally, by a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), we mean a KPA where the data x m is chosen by Eve.
In standard cryptography, one typically does not worry about ciphertext-only attack on nonrandom ciphers. The reason is that, under CTA, Eq. (11) is satisfied with equality for large n for the designed key length |K| = H(K) under a certain 'nondegeneracy' condition [12] that is readily satisfied. Thus, in practice, the data security is assumed to be sufficient if H(K) is chosen large enough by adjusting the key length. Under CTA, it is also the case for such ciphers that
i.e., the key is statistically independent of the ciphertext. Thus, no attack better than pure guessing can be launched on the key [12] .
The above two results do not hold for statistical and known-plaintext attacks. Eve can indeed launch an attack on the key and use her resulting information on the key to get at future and past data. In fact, it is such attacks that are the focus of concern for standard ciphers such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). For STAs, Shannon [8] characterized the security by the so-called unicity distance. The unicity distance n 0 of a cipher is the smallest input data length for which H(K|Y n 0 ) = 0.
In other words, if a plaintext sequence of length n 0 is encrypted by the cipher, the ciphertext contains enough information to fix the key (and hence, the plaintext) uniquely -the cipher has no information-theoretic security. For nonrandom ciphers defined by Eq. (8), Shannon, in [8] , derived in terms of the data entropy an estimate on n 0 that is independent of the cipher. This estimate is actually not a rigorous bound. Indeed, it can be shown that one of the inequalities used in the derivation goes in the wrong direction. Even so, the estimate works well empirically for English language plaintexts, for which n 0 ∼ 25 characters are found to be sufficient to break many ciphers.
We now consider, in some detail, security against known-plaintext attacks. Here, a natural quantity to consider is H(K|X n Y n ) since it provides a measure of key uncertainty when both plaintext and ciphertext are known to the attacker. Before we state the main result, we define the notion of nondegeneracy distance. The reader can readily convince himself that a finite unicity distance exists only if, for some n, there is no redundant key use in the cryptosystem, i.e., no plaintext sequence x n is mapped to the same ciphertext y n by more than one key value. With redundant key use, one cannot pin down the key but it seems that this may not enhance the system security either, and so is merely wasteful. The exact possibilities will be analyzed elsewhere. For now, we call a cipher nondegenerate in this paper if it has no redundant key use for some finite n or for n → ∞. Under the condition
which is similar but not identical to the definition of a 'nondegenerate' cipher given in [12] , one may show that, when Eq. (8) also holds, one has
so that the system is asymptotically broken under a known-plaintext attack. More generally, for a nonrandom cipher, we define a nondegeneracy distance n 1 to be the smallest n such that
holds, with n 1 = ∞ if (15) holds and there is no finite n satisfying (17) . Thus, a nonrandom cipher is nondegenerate in our sense if it has a nondegeneracy distance, finite or infinite. In general, of course, the cipher may be degenerate, i.e., it has no nondegeneracy distance. We can readily show (see Appendix A of [2] ) that, under known-plaintext attack, a nonrandom nondegenerate cipher is broken at data length n = n 1 , in the sense that
This is also the minimum length of data needed to break the cipher for any possible known-plaintext X n . Many ciphers including the one-time pad and LFSRs (linear feedback shift registers [7] ) have finite n 1 . If Eq.(18) holds when X n 1 is replaced by a specific x n 1 , n 1 defines the unicity distance corresponding to x n 1 . The overall unicity distance may be defined bȳ
n for some x n .
The above result has not been given in the literature, perhaps because H(K|X n Y n )
has not been used previously to characterize known-plaintext attacks. Nevertheless, it is assumed to be true in cryptography practice that K would be pinned down for sufficiently long n in a nonrandom 'nondegenerate' cipher. However, we emphasize that there is no analogous result on random ciphers, since under randomization, Eq.
(8) and usually (17) also, does not hold for any n.
Defining a random cipher to be nondegenerate if and only if the nonrandom cipher resulting from every particular assignment R = r of the randomizer is nondegenerate, we say it has information-theoretic security against known-plaintext attacks if
i.e., if H(K|X n , Y n ) cannot be made arbitrarily small whatever n is. The actual level of the information-theoretic security is quantified by the left side of (20) . One major motivation to study random ciphers is the possibility that they possess such information-theoretic security. Some discussion on this point is also available in
Advantages of Random Ciphers
The 'bare bones' description of a random cipher given above does not bring into focus the intuitive mechanism by which it may provide greater security than a nonrandom counterpart against known-plaintext attacks. In order to describe this mechanism, a schematic depiction of encryption and decryption with a random cipher is given in Fig. 1 . For a binary alphabet X = {0, 1}, let X n = {a 1 , . . . , a N } be the set of N = 2 n possible plaintext n-sequences. Let k be a particular key value. One can view the key k as dividing the ciphertext space Y n into N parts, denoted by the A k a i in the figure. Encryption of plaintext a i proceeds by first determining the relevant region A k a i and randomly selecting (this is the function of the private randomizer) as ciphertext some y ∈ A k a i ). The decryption condition Eq.(4) is satisfied by virtue of the regions A k a i being disjoint for a given k. Also shown in Fig. 1 is the situation where a different key value k ′ is used in the system. The associated partition of Y n consists of the sets A ′ k a i that are shown with shaded boundaries in Fig. 1 . The important point here is that the respective partitions of the ciphertext space for the key values k and k ′ be sufficiently 'intermixed'. More precisely, for any given plaintext a i , and any observed ciphertext y n , we require that there exist sufficiently many key values k (and hence a sufficiently large probability of the set of possible keys corresponding to a given plaintext and observed ciphertext) for which y n ∈ A k a i . In other words, a given plaintext-ciphertext pair can be connected by many possible keys. This is the intuitive basis why random ciphers offer better quantitative security (as measured either by Eve's information on the key or her complexity in finding it; see Sec. 4.2-4.4 for a discussion of αη security) than nonrandom ciphers against known-plaintext attacks. For a nonrandom stream cipher given by Eq. (5), it is usually the case that given the plaintext vector x i and ciphertext symbol y i , the value of the keystream z i is uniquely determined for a nondegenerate cipher. This is typically the case also in a random stream cipher when the value r taken by the randomizer R i is knownwe have called such ciphers nondegenerate random ciphers. In the absence of such knowledge in a nondegenerate random cipher, however, the different possible values taken by R i will in general allow many different values of the keystream for the given plaintext vector and ciphertext symbol. The more such possibilities exist, the less information is obtained about the keystream and the more 'secure' the cipher is. Our quantitative definition of random cipher given below introduces a parameter Γ that provides one way of quantifying the different knowledge of the keystream obtained in the above two scenarios by the number of additional possible keystreams for a given pair of input data and corresponding ciphertext symbols.
Definition (Γ-Random Cipher ) :
An Γ-Random Cipher is a random stream cipher of the form of Eq. (7) for which the following condition holds:
For every plaintext sequence, x n , for every i, for every ciphertext symbol y i obtainable by encryption of x n , and for every value r of R i ,
The bars | · | indicate size of the enclosed set. For a nonrandom stream cipher, the keystream z i is uniquely fixed by the plaintext vector x i and the ciphertext symbol y i . Therefore, if the randomizer conditions in the above equation are ignored, a nonrandom cipher can be taken to correspond to the limit where Γ = 0. Note that the sets whose sizes appear in the above equation, both for random ciphers and their nonrandom reductions, are constructed only on the basis of the i-th ciphertext symbol y i , and not on the basis of the entire ciphertext sequence. Thus, the definition only gives a measure of 'symbol-by-symbol' intermixing of possible keys, while the degree of intermixing of keys based on the entire ciphertext sequence (that is illustrated schematically by the overlap sets in Fig. 1 ) may be expected to be significantly less.
In this sense, our definition has a restricted scope but is easy to calculate with.
It is possible to satisfy the random cipher condition (9) with Γ = 0. This happens, e.g., when (21) holds for some ciphertext symbols with Γ > 0 but some others with Γ = 0, so the overall condition (21) is only satisfied for Γ = 0. A different measure of randomization Λ, bearing directly on (9), may be introduced for the case where the ciphertext alphabet is finite. For given x n , z i and r, let
Thus, condition (9) is equivalent to Λ > 0 for some x n , z i and r. The parameter Λ measures directly the degree of per symbol ciphertext randomization, while Γ measures the per symbol key redundancy. It is possible that a Λ = 0 random cipher is still useful due to the additional loads on Eve to record and store more information from her observation.
On the other hand, it follows from the definition of a nondegenerate (random) cipher that z i and y i are in one-to-one correspondence for given x i and r, thus Γ > 0 implies Λ > 0, i.e., a cipher with Γ > 0 is random in the sense of (9) .
We now discuss the advantages that a random cipher provides as compared to the situation for nonrandom ciphers. For the case of STA on the key when the plaintext X n has nonuniform but i.i.d. statistics, the so-called homophonic substitution method provides complete information-theoretic security, i.e. H(K|Y n ) = H(K) [12] . The original form of homophonic substitution involves assigning to each plaintext symbol a number of possible sequences of length l proportional to its a priori probability in such a way that all possible l-sequences are covered. Then, for every input symbol, if one of its assigned l-sequences is generated at random, the net effect is to generate l-sequences of plaintext with i.i.d. uniform statistics. These sequences may be passed through a non-degenerate cipher without revealing information on the key as per Eq. (14) . To put it another way, a statistical attack has been converted to a ciphertext-only attack. A generalized homophonic substitution that allows each symbol to be coded into sequences of variable length is discussed in [12] , for which it is shown that sometimes data compression instead of data expansion results.
Unfortunately, this reduction does not work for known-plaintext attacks. However, an inspection of the defining equation Eq.(21) for a random cipher (or Fig. 1) suggests how a random cipher may provide greater security against KPAs. For a given a plaintext-ciphertext sequence pair, Eq. (21) suggests that one has some residual uncertainty on the value of the keystream (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ), which does not exist for a corresponding nonrandom cipher. On the other hand, Eq.(21) refers only to the per-symbol uncertainty of the key stream calculated without regard to the ciphertext observed for the other symbols in the sequence. When such correlations are taken into account, the uncertainty on the keystream may be drastically reduced and we can give no general quantitative assertions of security. In fact, the general problem of attacking a random cipher has received limited attention because they are not used in practice due to the associated reduction in effective bandwidth or data rate as is evident in homophonic substitution, due to the need for high speed random number generation, and also due to the uncertainty on the actual input statistics needed for, e.g., homophonic substitution randomization. Thus, the quantitative security of random ciphers against known-plaintext attacks is not known theoretically or empirically, although in principle random ciphers could defeat STAs according to the result just mentioned.
Quantum Random Ciphers
The known and possible advantages of a random classical cipher over a nonrandom one were discussed in the previous section. While it is possible to implement a random cipher classically using random numbers generated on Alice's side, this is not currently practical at high (∼ Gbps) rates. As will become clear in the sequel, the quantum encryption protocol αη (Various implementations are described in [3, 15, 16, 17, 18] -The protocol in [18] is a variation on the original αη of [3] ) effectively implements a random cipher from Eve's point of view for many choices of her measurement, the difference from a classically random cipher being that it uses coherent-state quantum noise to perform the needed randomization. Before we describe αη, we define some concepts that capture the relevant features. As emphasized in Section 2.1, we will confine our attention to stream ciphers. First, we straightforwardly extend the usual stream cipher to one where the ciphertext is a quantum state. Our motivation for this definition is that, from the point of view of the legitimate users Alice and Bob, αη is a quantum stream cipher with negligible λ in the sense given below:
Definition (λ-Quantum Stream Cipher (QSC)):
A quantum stream cipher is a cipher for which the following two conditions are satisfied:
A. The encryption map e k (·) takes the n-symbol plaintext sequence x n to a quantum state n-sequence ρ in the n-fold tensor product form:
and B. Given the key k, there exists a measurement on the encrypted state sequence, that recovers each plaintext symbol x i with probability P dec > 1 − λ.
Here, as in Section 2.1, (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) is the keystream generated from the seed key K. A few comments will help clarify the definition. First, note that the tensor product form of the state in condition A retains for a quantum cipher the property of a classical cipher that one can generate the components in the n-sequence of states that constitute the output of a cipher one after the other in a time sequence. Note also that, analogous to a classical stream cipher, the i-th tensor component of ρ depends on just z i and (x 1 , . . . , x i ). Condition B is the generalized counterpart of the decryption condition Eq.(2) for a classical cipher -we now allow a small enough decryption error probability. Thus, the per-symbol error probability is bounded above by λ < 1.
We now want to bring the concept of classical random cipher defined in the previous section into the quantum setting. Our motivation in doing so is to show that, for an attacker making the same measurement on a mode-by-mode basis without knowledge of the key, αη reduces to an equivalent Γ-Random Cipher with significantly large Γ. Since the output of a quantum cipher is a quantum state and not a random variable, we will need to specify a POVM {Π yn } whose measurement result Y n supplies the classical ciphertext. Note that in this quantum situation different choices of measurement may result in radically different kinds of ciphertext. Note also that the user's and the attacker's measurements may be different. Our definition of a quantum random stream cipher below will apply relative to a chosen ciphertext Y n defined by its associated POVM. We will also assume that, from the eavesdropper's viewpoint, the same measurement is made on each of the n components of the cipher output. 
Several comments are given to explain this definition:
1. While condition QRC-B above appears similar to the condition QSC-B for a quantum stream cipher, there is a crucial difference. In the latter, the decryption probability P dec takes into account the possibility that the quantum measurement (as well as classical post-processing) made on the cipher state can depend on the key, i.e. it refers to Bob's rather than Eve's error probability. In QRC-B, we are considering the probability of error involved for Eve when she decrypts using a quantum measurement independent of the key followed by classical postprocessing that is , in general, "collective" and depends on the key. Thus, the parameter λ ′ is related to the symbol error probability under this latter restriction while the parameter λ in QSC-B is tied to the symbol error probability for a quantum measurement allowed to depend on the key. We see that there are two measurements implicit in our definition of a QRC -one made by the user with the help of the key, and the other given by {π y } made by the attacker without the key. See also Item 3 below. As we shall see, αη satisfies QRC-B with negligible λ ′ under a heterodyne measurement attack by Eve.
2. Γ in QRC-A, as in Eq. (21), is a measure of the 'degree of intermixing' of the regions of ciphertext space corresponding to different key values on a symbol-by-symbol basis.
3. Our stipulation that the same POVM be measured on each of the components of the cipher output is tantamount to restricting the attacker to identical measurements on each tensor component followed by collective processing. We will call such an attack a collective attack in this paper (also in [2] ). This definition is different from the usual collective attack in quantum cryptography [19] : in the latter, following the application of identical probes to each qubit/qumode, a joint quantum measurement on all the probes is allowed. In our case, there is no probe for Eve to set as we conceptually allow her a full copy of the quantum state. Doing so, we can upper bound her performance (This is an important feature of our socalled KCQ approach to encryption and key generation. See [4] for discussion.).
Thus, allowing a joint measurement, as also nonidentical measurements on each output component, will be called a joint attack. 4 . In analogy with the classical random cipher definition Eq,(21), one may wonder why the private randomizers R i used in that definition are missing from that of the quantum random cipher. Indeed, one may randomize the quantum state ρ i (x 1 , . . . , x i ; z i ) to ρ i (x 1 , . . . , x i ; z i ; r i ) using a private random variable with probability distribution p r i . However, since the value of R i remains unknown to both user and attacker (In fact, in a properly designed system, the user should not need to know R i in order to decrypt), one sees that all probability distributions of Bob's or Eve's measurements in this situation are given by the state
in which there is no explicit dependence on r i . In particular, we mention here that exactly such quantum state randomization, called Deliberate Signal Randomization (DSR), has been proposed in the context of αη in [4] for the purposes of enhancing the information-theoretic security of αη. The interesting point for the current discussion vis-a-vis DSR is that such randomization makes a cipher a quantum random cipher for any {π y } in the definition.
5.
It is important to observe that the definitions given above both for classical and quantum random ciphers are not arbitrary ones, but rather the mathematical characterizations of very typical situations involving randomization in classical and quantum cryptosystems.
We present an example of a QRC in the next section: the αη cryptosystem.
The αη cryptosystem 4.1 Operation
We now describe the αη system and its operation as a quantum cipher:
(1) Alice and Bob share a secret key K s .
(2) Using a key expansion function ENC( ), e.g., a linear feedback shift register or AES in stream cipher mode, the seed key K s is expanded into a running key sequence that is chopped into n blocks: K M n = ENC(K s ) = (K 1 , . . . , K mn ).
Here, m = log 2 (M), so that Z i ≡ (K (i−1)m+1 , . . . , K im ) can take M values. The Z i constitute the keystream.
(3) The encrypted state e Ks (X n ) of Eq.(23)is defined as follows. For each bit X i of the plaintext sequence X n = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), Alice transmits the coherent state
where α ∈ R and θ(Z i , r i ) = [Z i /M + (X i ⊕ P ol(Z i ))]π. P ol(Z i ) = 0 or 1 according to whether Z i is even or odd. This distribution of possible states is shown in Fig. 2 . Thus K i can be thought of as choosing a 'basis' with the states representing bits 0 and 1 as its end points. Note that the encoding makes αη a synchronous quantum stream cipher.
(4) In order to decrypt, Bob runs an identical ENC function on his copy of the seed key. For each i, knowing Z i , he makes a quantum measurement to discriminate just the two states |ψ Z i (x i ) and |ψ(Z i , x i ⊕ 1) .
The probability that Bob makes an error can be made negligibly small by choosing the mean photon number S ≡ |α| 2 large enough. In particular, the optimal quantum measurement [22] for Bob has error probability
It us thus apparent that αη is a λ-quantum cipher in the sense of Section 3 with λ ∼ 1 4 exp(−4S). For the mesoscopic level S ∼ 7 photons, this λ is ∼ 10 −12 , which is already below the standard acceptable BER of 10 −9 for an uncoded optical on-off 
For a fixed signal energy S, Eve's optimal error probability is numerically seen to go asymptotically to 1/2 as the number of bases M → ∞ (See Fig. 1 of [3] ). The intuitive reason for this is that increasing M more closely interleaves the states on the circle representing bit 0 and bit 1, making them less distinguishable. Therefore, 
αη as a Random Cipher and its security
We showed in the previous subsection that αη may be operated in a regime of S and M where it is a λ-quantum cipher for λ ∼ 0. We now show, that from Eve's point of view, under both a heterodyne and phase measurement attack, αη appears effectively as a quantum random cipher according to the characterization of Section 3. To this end, consider employing the following two measurements for obtaining {π y } in the quantum random cipher definition:
1) (Heterodyne measurement) π y = 1 π |y y|, y ∈ C.
2) (Canonical Phase measurement) π θ = 1 2π ∞ n,n ′ =0 e ι(n−n ′ )θ |n n ′ |, θ ∈ [0, 2π).
To show that the conditions for a QRC are satisfied, let us first consider QRC-B.
It may be shown [4] that the error probabilities λ ′ involved are respectively ∼ 1 2 e −S and ∼ 1 2 e −2S for the heterodyne and phase measurements. Turning to QRC-A, let us estimate the value of Γ under heterodyne and phase measurement. For a signal energy S, the heterodyne measurement is Gaussian distributed around the transmitted amplitude with a standard deviation of 1/2 for each quadrature while the phase measurement has an approximately Lorentzian distribution around the transmitted phase with standard deviation ∼ 1/ √ S. If we assume that, given a certain transmitted amplitude/phase, the possible ciphertext values are uniformly distributed within a standard deviation on either side and ciphertext val-ues outside this range are not reached (this will be called the wedge approximation),
we get the following estimates N het and N phase for the number of keystream values z i covered by the quantum noise under heterodyne and phase measurements:
If the value of the randomizer R is fixed (corresponding to rotation by a given angle within the wedge), Z i is fixed by the plaintext and ciphertext. Thus we have according to Eq. (21) that
and that
As expected, the Γ's of both measurements increase as the number of bases M increases, and decrease with increasing signal energy S that corresponds to decreasing quantum noise. For example, using the experimental parameters in [16] of S ∼ 4×10 4 photons and M ∼ 2 × 10 3 has Γ het ∼ 3. Since each basis is specified by m = log 2 (M) bits of the running key, and the seed key is revealed by a |K|-bit sequence of the running key, we obtain a brute-force search complexity of
For |K| = 4400 used in [16] , C ∼ 2 630 which is far beyond any conceivable search capability. While it is not known what Eve's optimal search complexity is, the advantage here is that this degree of randomization is achieved automatically by the coherent-state quantum noise at the ∼ Gbps rate of operation of the system. Note also that it is not hard to increase M while maintaining the same data rate because the number of bits needed to select a basis on the circle scales logarithmically with M.
αη: Information-theoretic and Complexity-Theoretic Security
We now consider in turn the information-theoretic (IT) and complexity-theoretic (CT) security of αη. In standard cryptography, no rigorous result is known about the quantitative security level of any cipher, save the one-time pad. Since αη includes a classical stream cipher ENC (See Fig. 1) , we may expect a similarly murky state of affairs regarding its quantitative security. However, under known-plaintext attacks, one can claim additional security for a suitably modified αη with any cipher ENC, as compared to ENC alone.
Information-theoretic (IT) Security
Considering first IT security, we will discuss in turn the cases of ciphertext-only, known-plaintext, and statistical attacks. As mentioned in Sec Even if Γ is large, the key security (and hence data security) is not as good as that of the ENC box alone for which the keystream bits are completely random to Eve.
This defect of αη may be removed by the use of Deliberate Signal Randomization (DSR) introduced in [4] . However, the analysis of systems using various forms of DSR are still under progress.
Let us now consider the case of known-plaintext attacks. As discussed in Sec.
2.2, most nonrandom ciphers have a nondegeneracy distance n 1 at which the key is fixed under a known-plaintext attack. We also mentioned that for random ciphers, such a distance may not exist, so that it is unknown whether or not they possess IT security against KPAs. Since αη is random, the same remark applies to it. However, there may exist a distance n 2 for αη and other random ciphers beyond which the key is fixed in a KPA. While rigorous analysis is difficult and not available, we believe that such is the case for the original αη with no modification, so that it has no IT security for large enough n.
The statistical attacks fall between the above two extremes. Thus, there may exist a crossover point where αη security becomes better than that of the ENC box alone as one moves from CTA towards KPA. However, no quantitative results, e.g., the unicity distance under STA, are known. To summarize, we believe that under all cryptographic attacks, αη has no IT security for large enough n, i.e., lim n→∞ H(K|Y E n ) = 0. However, the use of αη may extend the unicity distance beyond that of the cipher ENC used in it for some statistical attacks and for known-plaintext attacks.
Complexity-theoretic (CT) Security
Apart from IT security, the issue of complexity-theoretic (CT) security is of great practical importance. For standard ciphers, we have seen that there is no IT security beyond the nondegeneracy distance. Thus, standard ciphers rely for their security under KPA basically on the complexity of algorithms to find the key. We now compare the situation with that of αη. For any attack, the mere fact that H(K|Y E n ) = 0 (for CTA and STA) or H(K|Y E n X n ) = 0 (for KPA) does not mean that the unique key can be readily obtained from Y E n (and X n in the case of KPA). For most ciphers, one needs to run an algorithm to obtain it. At worst, this algorithm can be a brute force search -one decrypts Y E n with all the 2 |K| possible keys until a valid plaintext is obtained. This search can easily be made prohibitive by choosing |K| large enough -|K| ∼ 4000 used in experimental αη [16] is already way beyond conceivable search capability. Even the 'assisted' brute force search based on the possible running key values for each bit described in Sec. 4.2 has a complexity of ∼ 2 630 . In practice, heuristic algorithms based on the structure of the cipher are used to speed up the search. The rigorous quantitative performance of these algorithms is unknown for standard ciphers. However, one may view αη as an "enhancer" of security by providing an additional 'physical encryption' on top of the standard 'mathematical encryption' provided by the ENC box as follows.
For the ENC of Fig.1 used as a standard cipher, so that
let the nondegeneracy distance for KPA be n 1 . Let us assume that there exists an algorithm ALG(Y n 1 , X n 1 )) whose output is the seed key K s and that ALG has complexity C when used with inputs of length n 1 . In order to compare this complexity with that of αη, we assume that the same ENC is used in an αη system. However, since m bits of the keystream output of ENC are used to choose the basis for one data bit in αη, we first 'match' the data stream and keystream in αη as follows.
We expand the ENC output keystream by applying m deterministic m-bit to m-bit functions {f j } m j=1 to each keystream symbol Z i to get a new keystream Z ′ as follows:
We then use Z ′ instead of Z to choose the basis for each data bit.
The above modification results in the i-th m-block of ciphertext Y (i−1)m · · · Y im being dependent only on K (i−1)m · · · K im and X (i−1)m · · · X im for both ENC and αη with ENC. Under a KPA on ENC alone, using a known plaintext of length n 1 , K 1 . . . K n 1 is known exactly. For ENC augmented with αη in the described manner, it may happen that because of the randomization of Z ′ 1 · · · Z ′ n 1 , K 1 . . . K n 1 is not fixed by Y n 1 and X n 1 . In the latter case, we have IT security above that of ENC alone, even though such security may be lost for large enough n, as mentioned in the previous subsection.
Let us assume that, at the nondegeneracy distance n 1 of ENC, αη with ENC does not have IT security, so that H(K|X n 1 Y n 1 ) = 0. Assume also that n 1 = mk. Even in such a case, it appears harder to implement the algorithm ALG that finds the key.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the reason is that the randomization of the ciphertext Y i , for each i, leaves each Z i undetermined immediately after the measurement, even though, by our present assumption, only one possible seed key K can lead to the observed measurement results. If the number of possibilities for each Z i is l, Eve may need to run the algorithm ALG l k times resulting in a complexity of l n 1 /m C versus C for ENC alone. Of course, using a clever algorithm, she may be able to do much better. All we claim here is that αη provides an additional but unquantified layer of security over that of the ENC box against KPA, both in the IT and CT senses.
Thus, αη can be run on top of any standard cipher in use at present, e.g. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), and provides an additional, qualitatively different layer of physical encryption security over AES under a known-plaintext attack.
An interesting point is that, if the above level of CT security against knownplaintext attack is sufficiently high for some data length n, there is at least as much security against CTA for the same n. However, this comparison may not be practi-cally meaningful as a CTA can typically be launched for the entire sequence of data while usually only a much smaller segment of known-plaintext is available to the attacker.
Overview of αη Features
We summarize the main known advantages of αη compared to previous ciphers:
(1) For known-plaintext attacks on the key, αη has more IT and CT security compared to the case when the quantum noise is turned off.
(2) It may, when supplemented with further techniques [4] , have information-theoretic security against known-plaintext attacks that is not possible with nonrandom ciphers, and would also have maximal information-theoretic security against ciphertext-only attacks.
(3) With added Deliberate Signal Randomization (DSR) [4] , it is expected to have improved information-theoretic security on the data far exceeding the Shannon limit.
(4) It has high-speed private true randomization (from quantum noise that even Alice does not know), which is not possible otherwise with current or foreseeable technology.
(5) It suffers no reduction in data rate compared to other known random ciphers, because Bob needs to resolve only two and not M possibilities (i.e, one data bit is transmitted per qumode).
(6) It provides physical encryption, different from usual mathematical encryption, that forces the attacker to attack the optical line rather than simply the electronic bit output.
Nishioka et al's criticisms of αη
In this section, we discuss the criticisms made by Nishioka et al [5, 6] and respond to them. This section has substantial overlap with [20] .
Claims in Nishioka et al [6]
Nishioka et al claim that αη can be reduced to a classical non-random stream cipher under the attack that we now review. 
with probability very close to 1. In fact, for the parameters S = 100 and M = 200, they calculate the probability that Eq.(2) fails to hold to be 10 −44 , which value they demonstrate to be negligible for any practical purpose.
The authors of [6] further claim that the above function F j (i) (q) can always be represented as the XOR of two bit functions G j (i) (q) and l j (i) , where l j (i) depends only on the measurement result. Thus, they make the claim that the equation
holds with probability effectively equal to 1. They then observe that a classical additive stream cipher [7] (which is non-random by definition) satisfies
where r i , l i , andk i are respectively the ith plaintext bit, ciphertext bit and running key bit. Here,k i is obtained by using a seed key in a pseudo-random-number generator to generate a longer running key. The authors of [6] then argue that since l j (i) in Eq.(34), like the l i in Eq.(35), depends just on the measurement result, the validity of Eq.(34) proves that the security of Y-00 is equivalent to that of a classical stream cipher. In particular, they claim that by interpreting l j (i) as the ciphertext, Y-00 is not a random cipher, i.e., it does not satisfy Eq.(9) of the next section.
We analyze and respond to these claims and other statements in [6] in the following section.
Reply to claims in [6]
To begin with, we believe that Eq. (2) (Eq. (14) in [6] ) is correct with the probability given by them. This content of this equation is simply that Eve is able to decrypt the transmitted bit from her measurement data J N and the key K s . In other words, it merely asserts that Eq.(2) holds for Y N = J N . As such, it does not contradict, and is even necessary, for the claim that αη is a random cipher for Eve. In fact, we already claimed in [4] and [14] that such a condition holds. In this regard, note also that the statement in Section 4.1 of [6] that "informational secure key generation is impossible when ( Eq.(2) of this paper) holds" is irrelevant, since direct encryption rather than key generation is being considered here. Furthermore, we have already pointed out [2, 4, 14] that the Shannon limit prevents key generation with the experimental parameters used so far, a point missed in [5, 6, 11] . See also [24] .
We also agree with the claim of Nishioka et al that it is possible to find functions l j (i) and G j (i) (q), the former depending only of the measurement result j (i) , such that Eq.(34) holds, again with probability effectively equal to one. The error in [6] is to use this equation to claim, in analogy with Eq. (35), that αη is reducible to a classical nonrandom stream cipher.
To understand the error in their argument, note that, for Eq. (35) to represent an additive stream cipher, the l i in that equation should be a function only of the measurement result, andk i should be a function only of the running key. While the former requirement is true also for the l j (i) in Eq. (34), the latter is certainly false for the function G j (i) (Z i ) in Eq. (34), since it depends both on the measurement result j (i) and the running key Z i . Indeed, it can be seen that the definition of the function F j (i) (Z i ), and thus, G j (i) (q) depends on the sets C + j (i) and C − j (i) defined in Eq. (12) of [6] . The identity of these sets in turn depends on the relative angle between the basis q and Eve's estimated basisj (i) = j (i) mod M. Thus, it is clearly the case that G j (i) (Z i ) must depend both on j (i) and Z i , a fact also revealed by the inclusion of the subscript j (i) by the authors of [6] in the notation for G. by the statement in [6] that "It is a matter of preference what we should refer to as "ciphertext"." This is indeed true, especially considering that there are different possible quantum measurements that may be made on the quantum state in Eve's possession, each giving rise to a different ciphertext. This point is also highlighted by our definition of a qauntum random cipher. However, if one wants to claim equivalence to a non-random cipher for some particular choice of ciphertext Y N , one must show that Eq. (10) is violated and that Eq. (11) is satisfied using the chosen ciphertext in both equations. In other words, no equivalence to any kind of cipher is shown unless one can also decrypt with the chosen ciphertext and key alone.
However, one may readily see that, taking Y N = L N , Eq. (10) is not satisfied, i.e.,
The reason is that, as we noted from our analysis above of the function G j (i) (q), decrypting r i requires knowledge of certain ranges in which the angle between the basis chosen by the running key and the estimated basisj (i) falls.
To convey this information for every possible j (i) , one needs at least log 2 (2M) bits.
It follows that the single bit l j (i) is insufficient for the purpose of decryption, and so Eq. (10) cannot be satisfied for Y N = L N . Therefore, we conclude, that in the interpretation of L N as the ciphertext, decryption is not possible even if Eve has the key K s . Indeed, it is J N that can be regarded as a possible ciphertext, since Eq. (10) is satisfied for Y N = J N . However, with this choice of ciphertext, Y-00 necessarily becomes a random cipher, because H(J N |R N , K s ) = 0, a fact admitted by Nishioka et al in [6] .
We hope that the discussion above makes it clear that the 'reduction' of αη in [6] to a non-random cipher is false, and that in fact, no such reduction can be made under the heterodyne attack. considered in [6] . Indeed, as detailed in previous sections, the representation of ciphertext by Y N = J N does reduce it to a random cipher under the heterodyne attack. Its quantitative random cipher characteristics, namely Γ of Eq. (21) and Λ of Eq. (22) , are as follows, for various definitions of "ciphertext" adopted.
If the full continuous observation on the circle is taken as the ciphertext, then (28) shows that Γ ∼ 3 for typical experimental parameters. If the ciphertext alphabet is digitized and taken to be the 2M arc segments around the 2M states on the circle, then αη has, for any (x i , z i , r), Λ = Γ which is given by (28). If one attempts to 'de-randomize' the ciphertext by clubbing together the possibilities, Γ would increase while Λ would decrease. In the nonrandom limit where a fixed half-circle observation is taken to represent each bit value, which is the nonrandom reduction discussed in [14] , Γ would increase from that of Eq. (28) to M, making attacks on the key completely impossible. On the other hand, while Λ = 0 for the binary ciphertext alphabet adopted, the 2M-outcome ciphertext would lead, from Eq. (28), to an error probability per ciphertext bit for Eve [14] :
Eq. (37) is obtained in the wedge approximation on a per qumode basis for Eve, under the assumption that the state is uniformly distributed on the circle which is satisfied for uniform data and an LFSR for the ENC box of Fig. 1 . It leads to 0.1−1% error rate for Eve on the ciphertext for the experimental parameters of [3, 16] . As a consequence, the data security will far exceed the Shannon limit (11) . For any other ciphertext alphabet division of the circle, it is clear that Λ > 0 for any z i and x n from the same randomization for states near the ciphertext alphabet boundaries on the circle.
In sum, there can be no nonrandom reduction of αη. If the ciphertext alphabet is chosen to make αη nonrandom, then known-plaintext attack on the key is impossible and the ciphertext itself would be obtained with significant noise.
We conclude this section by responding to some other statements made in [6] .
In Section 3.3, Nishioka et al claim that "The value of l j (i) does not have to be the same as that of l j (i ′ ) when i = i ′ , even if j (i) = j (i ′ ) holds." This statement is in direct contradiction to their previous statement in the same subsection that "l j (i) depends only on the measurement value j (i) ".
In the same subsection, Nishioka et al claim that "In ([5]), we showed another concrete construction of l j (i) ...". We could find no explicit construction of l j (i) in that paper. We were led to the choice of l i described in [14] by the attempt to make the stream cipher representation Eq. (35) valid. In fact, such a representation is claimed by Nishioka et al in their Case 2 of [5] . It turned out, however, that decryption using that l i suffered a 0.1 − 1% error depending on the value of S used as noted above. See [14] for further details. While it was later claimed that they have a different reduction in mind [6] , the reduction in [14] is the only one that makes αη nonrandom (but in noise). In any case, as we have shown above, no construction of a single-bit from the heterodyne or phase measurement results can satisfy Eq. (2) with the extremely low probability given in [6] .
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For the case of key generation with uniform data, the output state is still uniformly distributed on the circle on a per-qumode basis to Eve. However, Bob's optimal performance has not been characterized with DSR. A detailed discussion of αη key generation will be presented later. We may observe that the use of DSR in direct encrypion would necessitate the use of an error-correcting mechanism in contrast with the original αη and would break the Shannon limit (12) . The significance and practicality of such variations of αη have been briefly mentioned in [4] , and will be treated elsewhere.
